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Abstract: Following instructions received from the U.S. Congress in the 2000
National Defense Authorization Act, the Department of Defense has prepared an
annual report on Chinese military power. This report contains classified and
unclassified editions. Documenting Chinese military space power developments
was one of the provisions in this law’s authorizing language. This article will
examine how Chinese military space power documents have been described by
DOD in during this report’s existence through 2015 and detail how members of
Congress and congressional committee hearing witnesses have reacted to these
developments in congressional hearing transcripts and in congressional debate
through Fall 2015.

A key legislative goal for the U.S. Congress during its biennial legislative
sessions is writing 12 major pieces of annual appropriations legislations for
various cabinet departments. One of these departments is the Department of
Defense (DOD) and each year Congress and its relevant departmental oversight
committees must write, pass, and get presidential signature on appropriations
legislation for these departmental missions and programs to receive funding.
Besides overall agency funding information and funding for specific programs
administered by these agencies, the content of these appropriations bills includes
information such as criminal penalties for violating laws administered by these
agencies, how long these programs are to be carried out, and reports agencies are
required to submit to Congress on how they administer agency programs as part
of Congress’ constitutionally mandated federal agency funding and oversight
process[1].
This process is supposed to be done by the beginning of the federal fiscal year
on October 1. However, polarization between congress and recent presidential
administrations of opposing parties has often seen both of these groups fail to
reach budget agreements by this deadline and forced the passage of continuing
resolutions to sustain funding of agency programs and existing levels until
mutually agreeable funding levels are agreed to[2].
DOD’s annual appropriations legislation frequently includes extensive
congressionally mandated reporting requirements. This was true in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 enacted on 5 October 1999.
Prompted by congressional concern over increasing Chinese military spending and
assertiveness and the growing economic and strategic importance of the AsianPacific region to U.S. geopolitical interests, Section 1202 of this statute mandated

that DOD prepare annual classified and unclassified versions of this report for the
House and Senate Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees on Chinese
military and technological developments and how they might affect Chinese
grand strategy, security strategy, military strategy, and military organizations and
operational concepts. Numerous specific details mandated by Congress in these
reports cover China’s strategy to become the leading power in the Asia-Pacific
region; Beijing’s strategy toward Taiwan; developments in Chinese military
doctrine; and its efforts to develop, acquire, and gain access to information,
communication, space, and other advanced technologies to enhance its military
capabilities. This work examines how this annual DOD report on Chinese military
power has detailed Chinese military space developments and will also cover
congressional reaction to these developments[3].

Annual Reports on Chinese Military Power
Reports: 2000-2004: The first DOD report Annual Report on the Military Power of
the People’s Republic of China was released in 2000. It mentioned that strategic
objectives of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which includes all branches
of China’s military, called for elite forces capable of dominating all battlespace
spheres include space and electromagnetic and that China was capable of
launching military photoreconnaissance satellites though the technology for these
satellites was obsolete by western standards. This document noted the October
1999 launch of the China-Brazil Earth Resources (CBERS) satellite could provide
some militarily beneficial data and that the upcoming decade could see Beijing
attempt to develop near-real-time electro-optical imaging satellite and a highresolution film-based photo reconnaissance satellite[4].
Initial Pentagon assessments of Chinese military space interests from this
inaugural report include most Chinese reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting
capabilities being indigenous in nature despite some foreign technical assistance;
China desiring to develop manned launch capability by 2001; achieving military
space systems between 2010-2020; acquiring foreign technologies to develop
anti-satellite (ASAT) capability which may include laser radars to track and image
satellites and potentially acquiring an advanced radar system to track satellites in
low earth orbit (LEO); developing jammers to be used against Global Positioning
System (GPS) satellites; and potentially developing laser or other weapons
capable of destroying satellites[5].

The 2000 report also noted Chinese collaborative space ventures with
countries as varied as Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, India, Russia, South Korea,
the United Kingdom, and United States; how the Chinese aerospace industry
seeks to integrate GPS and Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS)
technology into jet fighters and helicopters; and Beijing’s attempts to acquire
commercial satellite imagery from foreign countries to be integrated into efforts
to develop digital terrain maps for targeting, missile guidance, and planning[6].
The next edition of this report appeared in 2002. This report noted that
Beijing’s procurement of space systems, early warning aircraft and unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), and over-the-horizon radar would enhance its ability to
detect, monitor, and target Western Pacific naval activity. Further, the report
highlighted that, in July 2001, a Sino-Russian five-year space cooperation
agreement would produce joint development of a regional missile defense system
and provide $500 million funding for new generation high-technology
weapons[7].
This treatise also noted the increasing emphasis placed by Chinese military
strategists on space as an operational theater of war by referencing this quotation
from Captain Shen Zongchang of the Chinese Naval Research Institute:
The mastery of outer space will be a requisite for military victory, with
outer space becoming the new commanding heights for combat….lightning
attacks and powerful first strikes will be more widely used in the future….In
future wars….radar, radio stations, communications facilities, and command
ships [become] priority targets vulnerable to smart weapons, electronic
attack, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons[8].
This report also noted that China publicly opposes space militarization and
seeks to prevent of slow development of ASAT systems and space-based missile
defenses. Privately, though, Chinese leaders view ASAT and offensive
counterspace systems as inevitable while striving to acquiring various foreign
technologies which could be used to develop active ASAT capabilities. The PLA
also has thorough knowledge of U.S. and foreign space operations from opensource information; it may seek an advanced radar system capable of tracking
LEO satellites and develop jammers which could be used against GPS receivers;
and that it could have some capability of damaging optical sensors on satellites
highly vulnerable to laser damage[9].
This report’s 2003 edition noted China is placing major emphasis on improving
space-based reconnaissance and surveillance and that once such systems are fully

deployed they will give Beijing a strong and diversified space reconnaissance
capability with regional coverage. 15 May 2002 saw the launching of China’s first
oceanological satellite which is intended to collect precise data about oceanic
color and temperature. This document also noted that China may have acquired
high-energy laser weapons and technological assistance while being potentially
interested in developing ground-based ASAT capability. Beijing also seeks
augmentation of its space launch capability by developing a modular class of
heavy space-launch vehicles while aspiring to achieve the ability to launch 25 tons
to LEO and 14 tons to geosynchronous orbit by 2007[10].
The following year’s edition of this report (2004), occurring during a
presidential election campaign, mentioned that developing intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability is a key component of the PLA’s
local wars doctrine. Additional 2003 Chinese military space developments noted
in this report were:
 Launching Ziyuan 1 and 2 remote sensing satellites in October 2003 with
Brazil. One of these satellites has 19 meter resolution and another is
anticipated to have digital imagery collecting capability and sunsynchronous orbit with global coverage and near real-time imagery
download covering most of eastern Asia to potential ground sites in eastern
and Central China.
 The next decade is likely to see China deployed advanced ISR and earth
resource systems with military applications while potentially deploying an
improved film-based photoreconnaissance satellite.
 China is also interested in developing electronic and signals intelligence
satellites and has acquired mobile data reception equipment capable of
transmitting to deployed military forces.
 It is possible China may use low energy lasers to blind sensors on LEO
satellites[11].
Reports: 2005-2009
The George W. Bush Administration’s second term saw the DOD continue
documenting Chinese military space developments in these annual reports. Its
2005 edition noted that long-term enhancements in Beijing’s Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(C4ISR) capabilities such as space-based and over-the-horizon platforms could
facilitate identification, tracking, and targeting foreign military activities deep into
the western Pacific and provide potentially hemispheric coverage[12].

This assessment also noted that PLA theorists and planners believe future military
campaigns will be conducted simultaneously on land, sea, air, space, and
electronically and that China is developing and enhancing its counterreconnaissance and counterspace capabilities in areas including low-tech denial
and deception based on camouflage, cover, and concealment to high-tech lasers
and space tracking devices. China launched its first manned space crew into orbit
on October 15, 2003 and press reports indicated a two-person crew on a five day
mission would be launched in September 2005. In addition China is developing
microsatellites weighing less than 100 kilograms (kg) for remote sensing and
networks of electro-optical and radar satellites, aspires to have 100 satellites in
orbit by 2010, and hopes launch an additional 100 satellites by 2020 and have a
full space station in orbit by 2020[13].
The 2006 edition of this report mentioned China was replacing Long March
rockets by developing newer boosters to expand the reach of their anti-access
forces. It also noted that CBERS satellites were capable of taking 20 meter
resolution images in swaths over 100 kilometers (km) and transmitting these
digital images to earth stations. This report further mentioned that China had
launched three BeiDou satellites providing 20 meter accuracy navigation cover
over China and surrounding areas; that BeiDou is an active positioning system
requiring transmissions between the satellite and user resulting in a slower time
for the user to receive the corrected position; and that BeiDou is most suitable for
slow-moving troops, ships, and vehicles[14].
Additional contents of the 2006 report include coverage of Beijing’s manned
space launch mission between 12-17 October 2005 in which Chinese astronauts
performed experiments in space; its hopes to perform a 2007 space walk;
demonstrate rendezvous and docking capability between 2009-2012; expanding
indigenous satellite development capability; developing technologies for radiofrequency weapons and precision guided munitions; and enhancing space
situational awareness capabilities to track and identify satellites and take hostile
action against them[15].
The 2007 report began by noting China’s successful 11 January 2007 test of an
ASAT against an FY-1 weather satellite in LEO and the international uproar
produced by this event which could endanger human space flight and jeopardize
the assets of space faring nations. It also noted the October 2006 publication of
China’s Space Activities in 2006 which detailed that country’s space activities
without providing information on its space programs and counterspace
activities[16]

Additional contents of this appraisal mentions the PLA’s desire to acquire
precision strike capabilities to threaten western Pacific airbases, ports, surface
combatants, land and space-based C4ISR, air defense systems, and command
facilities; observed that China desires developing its space and counterspace
capabilities as means of augmenting national power; and referenced Colonel Yuan
Zelu’s 2005 book Space War Campaigns published by the PLA’s National Defense
University Press as advocating space shock and awe to deter enemies, focusing
space strike objectives on important information sources such as command and
control systems and communications hubs to shake an enemy’s operational
organizational system and cause enormous impact on opposing policymakers[17].
In addition, the 2007 report also included Table 1 documenting Chinese space
assets:
Table 1. Chinese space assets
Communication Satellites

14

Navigation Satellites

3

Meteorological Satellites

3

Remote Sensing/Imagery Satellites

6

Scientific Satellites

8

Manned Space Satellites

1

Total

35[18].

From p. 42 of the 2007 edition of The Military Power of the People’s Republic of
China, a U.S. Government publication thus not subject to copyright.
This report’s 2008 edition noted how the lack of transparency about Chinese
defense spending and policies increases the risk of instability by increasing the
possibility of misunderstanding and miscalculation and noted that China launched
its first lunar orbiter Chang’e 1 on 24 October 2007 which achieved lunar orbit on
5 November 2007. This achievement demonstrated China’s ability to conduct
complicated space maneuvers, which has salient implications for military

counterspace operations. During its lunar orbit, China used stereo cameras and xray spectrometers to map lunar surface three dimensional images for mapping
lunar mineral resources for potential future use by Chinese industry[19].
Other key 2007 Chinese military space developments documented by the 2008
report included developing the Long March 5 improved heavy lift rocket capable
of lifting larger reconnaissance satellites into low-earth orbit or communication
satellites into geosynchronous orbits by 2012; constructing a new satellite launch
facility on Hainan Island; replacing foreign produced satellites with indigenously
produced satellites by 2010; and PLA writings emphasizing the imperative of:
“destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance,
observation, and communications satellites,” suggesting that such systems, as
well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among initial targets of
attack to “blind and deafen the enemy….”[20].
The 2008 report also noted the PLA’s developing various kinetic and non-kinetic
weapons and jammers to degrade or deny other countries abilities to use spacebased platforms while also research and deploying capabilities to disrupt satellite
operations and functionality without causing physical damage. The PLA is also
exploring satellite jammers, kinetic energy weapons, high-powered lasers and
microwave weapons, particle beam weapons, and electromagnetic pulse
weapons for potential counterspace use[21].
The 2008 report also noted that production trends and governmental resource
allocations have particularly favored China’s missile and space system industries
in recent years. Short and medium range ballistic missile final assembly and
rocket motor production facilities have received significant upgrades. Besides
supplying indigenous military needs, this expanded infrastructure could also be
used to enhance Chinese missile and space system exports[22].
The advent of 2009 saw the presidency transition from the two-term GOP
administration of George W. Bush to the Democratic administration of Barack
Obama. The increasing importance of Chinese military space programs was also
reflected in this year’s edition of Chinese Military Power. This document noted
improvements in Chinese anti-access area denial (A2AD) capability due to
improvements in Beijing’s space-based reconnaissance and positioning,
navigation, and timing capabilities, and in survivable terrestrial over-the-horizon
targeting consequently decreasing gaps in creating precision-strike capability.
This document also noted that PLA strategists see space as central to facilitating
contemporary informatized warfare and “the commanding point for the
information battlefield”[23].

This 2009 report also referenced Chinese military writings emphasizing
counterspace warfare as having “Assassins Mace” capabilities exploiting potential
opponents perceived vulnerabilities. “Assassins Mace” refers to asymmetric
military capabilities used by China or other countries to overcome their
inferiorities to United States and U.S.-allied forces by exploiting weaknesses in the
military capabilities of conventionally superior forces. In China’s case, it can
include using ballistic missiles and anti-satellite weapons. The 2009 report also
stated that Chinese space assets and capabilities affect their A2AD programs for
Taiwan Strait contingencies and beyond; mentioned Chinese taikonauts
performing their first space in 2008 from the Shenzou VII; this same mission
deploying the Banxing-1 small imaging satellite which successfully positioned
itself into orbit around the Shenzou VII; that manned spaceflight is one of “16
special areas” in which China plans to develop or expand indigenous capabilities;
and that naturalized U.S. citizen and Chinese national Shu Quan-Sheng who
worked as physicist for Newport News, VA-based high tech company AMAG
International pleaded guilty to violating the Arms Export Control Act by giving
Beijing information on the design and development of a space launch vehicle’s
fueling system[24].

Reports: 2010-2015
The 2010 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of
China report mentioned the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)
commemorating its 60th anniversary on 11 November 2009 with its Commander
General Xu Qilang contending that military competition extending to space is
“inevitable” and that the PLAAF has transitioned from emphasizing homeland
defense to integrating air and space. This report also announced that China
launched a navigation satellite on 15 April 2009; hopes to have a complete
network of GPS satellites for civilian and military users by 2015-2020; that
development and testing of the Long March V rocket continues; and that
construction of a launch facility near Wenchang on Hainan Island began in 2008
[25].
During a March 2009 speech to China’s People’s National Congress President
Hu Jintao urged the military to concentrate on “building core military capabilities”
which includes securing space-based assets. The 2010 edition of this report also
alluded to the PLA’s theoretical military journal China Military Science contending

“it is in space that information age warfare will come into its more intensive
points”; that space-based communications, intelligence, and navigable systems
enable coordinating joint operations and winning modern wars; and that
destroying, damaging, and interfering with U.S. and U.S. allies military satellites
and sensors will prevent them from taking the battlefield initiative and bringing
precision-guided munitions into play[26].
This report’s 2011 edition noted Beijing’s launching 5 BeiDou navigation
satellites in 2010 and an overall national record of 15 during that year. It also
announced that the Long March V rocket is expected to be launched from
Wenchang during 2014; that General Qiliang’s assertion of space becoming an
inevitable conflict arena was contradicted by President Hu Jintao; that Beijing
seeks to use space as an instrument of an “information blockade” strategy against
prospective military adversaries; that it is expanding its ballistic missile and
aerospace missile defense umbrella to include kinetic intercept capability at exoatmospheric altitudes >80 km; and that in January 2010 China successfully.
achieved a mid-course ballistic missile intercept using a ground-based missile[27].
The 2012 edition of this report noted that PLAAF is beginning to develop
ballistic missile defenses and air-space integration needed for early warning; the
September 2011 launch of the Tiangong space station module and the Tianlian 1B
communications relay satellite facilitating near real-time data transfer to ground
stations from manned space capsules or orbiting satellites. This report also
acknowledged that Beijing’s space and counterspace platforms face some systems
reliability problems with communications satellites using the standard DFH-4
launch platform experiencing failures resulting in reduced lifespan or satellite
loss. August 2011 saw these problems demonstrated when a Long March 2C
rocket carrying an experimental Shijian 11 satellite malfunction after liftoff failing
to deliver the satellite to orbit and was the third Chinese satellite launch in one
week[28].
The 2013 report marked the beginning of the Obama Administration’s second
term. It mentioned that 2012 saw Beijing conduct 18 space launches including 11
new remote sensing satellites capable of executing civilian and military
applications. It also revealed that Zhang Youxia of the Central Military
Commission’s General Armament Department was responsible for the military
weapon’s development and space program and reiterated the importance of
space in China’s as a combat arena in Beijing’s information blockade strategy[29].
Additional determinations of this report include the PLA General Staff
Department’s Fourth Department (Electronic Countermeasures and Radar) being

likely to use information operations tools such as jamming, electronic warfare,
computer network operations, and deception to enhance counter-space and
kinetic operations during wartime situations; the successful January 2013
intercept of a mid-course ballistic missile using a ground-based missile; that
recent upgrades to primary final assembly and rocket motor production facilities
have enhanced production of various missiles for the PLA and export markets; the
growth of China’s space launch industry to include supporting satellite launch
services and the manned space program; and that their ballistic and cruise missile
systems are comparable to international competitors[30].
DOD’s 2014 report noted a number of Chinese space policy developments.
These included counter-space weapons being a critical part of China’s 2013
defense spending of $119.5 billion representing a 5.7% annual increase, China
conducting at least 8 space launches this year enhancing its space-based ISR
capabilities and meteorological and communications satellite constellations; the
successful launch of the Kuaizhou intended to launch a small satellite into LEO to
support natural disaster monitoring; and development of the Long March 11 to
provide a capability of quick launch for disaster and contingencies monitoring
with a 2014-2016 launch window[31].
Beijing continues developing the Long March 5 space launch vehicle which
more than doubles the size of payloads it can place in geosynchronous orbit. The
Pentagon report also mentions that distinguishing between Chinese civilian and
military space end-use is difficult due to opaque corporate structures, hidden
asset ownership, and connections of communications personnel with the central
government. It also mentions that some commercial entities are affiliated with
PLA research institutes or have ties to and are subject to the control of
governmental organizations including the State Owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission[32].
This report also noted China may expand its national early warning network to
provide space defense as well as protect territorial air space and waters. Such
efforts include China’s increasing reconnaissance, data relay, navigation, and
communications satellites; Beijing improving its reconnaissance technologies to
include infrared multi-spectrum, pulsed Doppler, phased array, and passive
detection with over-the-horizon skywave radar being an important component of
China’s enhanced strategic early warning capabilities. The U.S. Department of
State also announced that China conducted a non-destructive test of an LEO ASAT
on July 23, 2014[33].

This report’s 2015 edition announced that China holds the world’s most rapidly
maturing space-launch program and is using its orbital and ground-based assets
to drive national civil, economic, military, and political goals. As of October 2014,
Beijing had launched 16 spacecraft. In 2014, DOD’s annual report went on to
assert that Beijing has invested in advanced space capabilities including satellite
communications, ISR, satellite navigation, and meteorology along with manned,
unmanned, and interplanetary space exploration. This investment also
incorporates a large ground infrastructure supporting spacecraft and space launch
vehicle manufacture and launch, command and control, and data downlink[34].
China also seeks to use space systems for establishing real-time and accurate
surveillance, reconnaissance, and warning systems, and to enhance joint
operations command and control.
Other significant 2014 Chinese space
program accomplishments that were documented included:
 The first sub-meter resolution imager achieved by the Gaofen-2 satellite;
 The October 2014 launch of the Chang’e-5 test spacecraft intended to
retrieve and return lunar samples to earth with a planned 2017 mission;
 Completing construction on Hainan Island’s Wenchang Space launch center
with intent to launch Long March 5 and Long March 7 space launch vehicles
no later than 2016.
 Conducting a July 23, 2014 space launch destroying a defunct weather
satellite comparable to the 2007 weather satellite destruction[35].
PLA strategists consider the ability to use space-based systems and denying
adversaries access to such systems as facilitating “informatized” warfare. In
addition missile and space industries are prioritized sectors for Chinese defense
spending; July 2014 saw Chinese national I Bo Cai plead guilty to violating the
Arms Export Control Act and International Trafficking in Arms Regulations while
attempting to export sensors intended for line-of-sight stabilization and precision
control mechanisms manufactured for DOD to China; the location of Chinese
space launch facilities besides Hainan Island’s Wenchang including Jinquan in
northwest Gansu province, Taiyuan in northern Xangi province, and Xichang in
southwest Sichaun province; and China’s aspiration to construct a space station
by 2022[36].

Congressional Reaction: Debate and Legislative Provisions

Since the 2000 Defense Authorization Act establishing this report was enacted
by Congress, there has been intense congressional interest in commenting on
DOD’s annual Chinese military power report findings. These comments are most
commonly expressed during House and Senate floor debate, through legislative
amendments, and in congressional committee hearings. Representative
samplings of congressional comment on this this report and its potential
implications for U.S. military policy have been expressed on a bipartisan basis
over the report’s 15 year existence.
During debate over the 2002 defense budget, the House directed the Pentagon
to prepare a report on weapons sales and transfers from the former Soviet Union
to China which would include manned and unmanned space operations[37]. On 2
October 2001, Senator Jon Kyl (Republican, Arizona) offered an amendment
requiring DOD to assess Chinese efforts to acquire dual-use technologies including
those covering space[38].
On 2 February 2005, Rep. Elton Gallegly (Republican, California) introduced H.
Res. 57 urging the European Union (EU) to maintain its arms embargo on China
referencing the 2004 DOD Chinese military power report citing China’s increasing
military space systems as justification for this resolution[39]. Language in the
2011 Defense Authorization Act presented by House Armed Services Committee
Chair Represenative Ike Skelton (Democrat, Missouri) included an amendment
requiring DOD to report on developments in Chinese A2AD capabilities[40]. The
following year’s Defense Authorization Act presented by Senate Armed Services
Committee Chair Senator Carl Levin (Democrat, Michigan) include the following
requirements for DOD’s annual report on Chinese military power:
The strategy and capabilities of Chinese space programs, including trends,
global and regional activities, the involvement of military and civilian
organizations, including state-owned enterprises, academic institutions, and
commercial entities, and efforts to develop, acquire, or gain access to
advanced technologies that would enhance Chinese military capabilities[41].
On December 11, 2014, Senator Marco Rubio (Republican, Florida)
emphasized Chinese investments in space warfare, acquiring the ability to destroy
U.S. satellites recognizing heavy U.S. dependence on having a technological
advantage through national security space assets, and that China is a serious
threat to observe and monitor[42]. Concern over Chinese space capabilities was
also reflected in language in the proposed 2016 National Defense Authorization
Act’s House version including prohibitions on relying on Chinese and Russian

space-based weather data and similar language prohibiting integrating Chinese
and Russian missile defense systems into U.S. missile systems[43].

Congressional Committee Hearings
Debate and questioning in congressional committee oversight hearings has also
produced reaction to developments described in the annual reports on Chinese
military power. A 23 May 2007 House Oversight and Government Reform
Committee hearing discussed the 11 January 2007 Chinese ASAT test, with
Represenative John Tierney (Democrat, Massachusetts) noting the troubling U.S.
and international significance of this event, contending that this single Chinese
test increased the threat to satellites in LEO by 40%. This hearing also saw DOD
National Security Space Office Director Major General James B. Armor, Jr. note
that this Chinese action produced thousands of pieces of long-lived orbital debris,
is inconsistent with China’s stated position on preventing an arms race in outer
space, as well as its signed agreement to mitigate space debris. He also noted
China is developing a wide-range of anti-access and aerial denial capabilities
including direct ascent ASAT, radio frequency jammers and other capabilities to
transform their military forces, and that Beijing is developing and deploying
modern intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites with advanced
command and control, communications, and targeting capabilities[44].
An 18 March 2009 House Armed Services Committee hearing noted the
Chinese military power report’s observation of Beijing’s pursuit of a
multidimensional program to limit or prevent use of space-based assets by
China’s adversaries with Representative Michael Turner (Republican, Ohio)
expressing skepticism Beijing would halt its space programs. This hearing also
saw Council on Foreign Relations witness Bruce W. MacDonald mention that
China could exploit U.S. dependence on space within a decade to seriously
threaten our space assets, and that current space policy does not address space
debris accumulation[45].
During a 11 May 2011 hearing by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Representative Frank Wolf (Republican, Virginia) noted China’s
space program in the past decade advancing from launching their first manned
spacecraft to developing plans for an advanced space station to rival the

International Space Station; developing a powerful rocket capable of achieving a
moon landing and exploring deep space; achieving a manned moon landing; and
his concern about the PLA leading China’s space efforts. Hearing witness Mark
Stokes from the Project 2049 Institute noted the key role played by the PLA’s
General Staff Department’s Intelligence Department in developing space imagery
and radar systems and the critical roles played in Chinese space development by
the Chinese Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and China Aerospace
Science and Industry Corporation[46].
This same hearing saw witness Barry Watt of the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Asssessments mention that he didn’t think the Chinese military could
interfere with U.S. space assets during the 2010s, but thought this would become
more likely in the 2020s. Stokes also told Commission Co-Chair Senator Richard
Blumenthal (Democrat, Connecticut) that the Chinese are following Soviet tactics
by placing key emphasis on using electronic countermeasures as means of
degrading potential adversaries use of space such as using communication
satellite jammers, jamming synthetic aperture radar satellites, or using laser
systems to dazzle U.S. electro-optical systems or other assets[47].
A 28 January 2014 House Armed Services Committee hearing saw Ashley Tellis
of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace make the following assertion
about Chinese military space programs:
…the current and the evolving counterspace threat posed by China to U.S.
military operations in the Asia-Pacific theater and outside is extremely
serious. And the threat ranks on par with the dangers posed by Chinese
offensive cyber operations to the United States more generally.
…the diversity and the complexity of China’s counterspace programs make
them particularly problematic, because they span the gamut all the way from
direct-ascent and co-orbital ASAT [anti-satellite] programs, which receive
enormous attention, to equally challenging threats like electronic warfare
intended to paralyze U.S. satellite communications, which actually get very
little attention, to more recondite dangers, such as directed-energy weapons
and radiofrequency weapons and computer network attack capabilities,
which are rather hard to understand. So it is the complexity and the diversity
of these threats that magnify the challenges faced by the United States.
…these dangers are acute because the U.S. space systems which are the
targets of China’s activities are simultaneously extraordinarily vulnerable and
extraordinarily valuable at the same time.

…the incentives that drive China to pursue its counterspace programs are
strong and will only intensify over time for the simple reason that China views
itself as being in a geopolitical competition with the United States and
believes that it must prepare itself for a possible conflict with a superior U.S.
military. Given this perception, Chinese military planners are deeply focused
on neutralizing American space capabilities because of their belief that such
neutralization is essential to whittle down the information dominance on
which the United States military depends on for its success.
…Given China’s incentives and the reasons why it is pursuing a counterspace
program, I do not believe Beijing can be dissuaded from moving through a
different direction through arms-control agreements.
The only way to persuade China that its counterspace programs
will not deliver the returns that it seeks, if there is any way at all,
is for the United States to ensure that its military forces can operate
successfully despite China’s investments in counterspace. This will require,
at the very least, diverse new kinds of investments, which are essential for
the United States to protect its success in power projection operations that
will be necessary in the years to come[48].
Witness Robert Butterworth of Aries Analytics Inc. stressed China wishes to
know which U.S. satellites to kill in order to achieve desired degradation of U.S.
military capabilities; that the U.S. should expect more extensive Chinese
examination and operational probes of Washington’s satellite capabilities in the
future; that the U.S. should further harden satellite subsystems to resist thermal
and electronic attacks; and that the U.S. must find ways to engage and defeat
attacking weapons prior to their engaging U.S. satellites. Butterworth also
stressed that the U.S. needs to more realistically test its space forces ability to
detect and respond to attacks on its space assets and that the U.S. and China are
in a long-term military competition involving significant effort in space[49]. A
post-hearing question of note asked by Rep. Randy Forbes (Republican, Virginia)
to witness Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center with Krepon’s answer being:
Mr. FORBES. How aggressive is China pursuing counterspace technology that
would put at risk the open and peaceful use of space? What insight do we
have into their intent for developing such technology? What motivates them,
and what would de-motivate them in this pursuit?
Mr. KREPON. According to published reports, the PLA is testing capabilities
and practicing techniques that could be applied against satellites. These

capabilities are not unique to China; all major space-faring nations, including
the United States, can be expected to possess them. When any country tests
such capabilities, others might infer hostile intent, or preparations to be ready
to employ these techniques in the event of authorization to engage in
warfare. Or they might serve deterrent purposes. Or these practices might
suggest, in China’s case, a perceived need to play catchup ball. I am not a
China scholar, so I am not well versed enough to hazard a guess about which
of these possible motivations, or which combination of motivations,
applies[50].
The following exchange between Representative Mike Rogers (Republican,
Alabma) and Tellis also offers revelatory insights on what the loss of U.S. access to
space would mean for U.S. national security interests:
Mr. ROGERS. What are the national security implications if our military lost
access to space capabilities in a conflict with the People’s Republic of China?
Beyond national security, if a system such as Global Positioning System (GPS)
was threatened, what would be the potential economic and civil impact on
the United States?
Dr. TELLIS. I think it would be safe to say—as a first cut—that the loss of U.S.
space capabilities to China in a conflict would be simply catastrophic to the
United States. There is no other national military that relies on space for its
operational effectiveness as much as the U.S. military. Nor is there any other
society that relies on space for its economic wellbeing as much as the United
States. The loss of U.S. access to space for both military and civilian
endeavors would, therefore, be calamitous. Given this fact, it is unfortunate
that we still do not have a comprehensive understanding of what exactly
would entail operationally if the U.S. military were to lose access to space in a
conflict with China. I believe that assessments of this kind are just beginning
and it will probably be a while before they are complete[51].
Conclusion
DOD’s annual report on Chinese military power is an important source of
declassified information on all aspects of China’s military programs. It has been
prepared for nearly fifteen years[52]. Its contents include text, statistics, visual
analytics, and cartography. During its historical and ongoing evolution this report
has tracked Chinese military developments across the air, land, sea, and space
spectrums of military power. These reports have repeatedly demonstrated that

China is steadily increasing its civilian and military space capabilities with their
most likely targets to be U.S. and allied militaries and strategic aspects in the
western Pacific Ocean and space. Another consistent revelation of these reports
is that space control is a core geopolitical goal of China’s strategic aspirations.
Consulting these reports is an essential requirement for those desiring enhanced
understanding of Chinese military space power trends and developments and
their potential impact on U.S. and allied countries strategic and aerospace
interests.
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